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The Case to Save 
Maine’s Bases 
by Derek P. Langhauser
CASE TO SAVE MAINE’S BASES
In this article, Derek Langhauser gives a post mortem 
of  Maine’s response to the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Commission’s announcement of  imminent 
closures in Portsmouth-Kittery, Brunswick and Limestone. 
Although Maine did not “win back” the Brunswick 
facility, Maine rescued the facilities in Portsmouth-
Kittery and Limestone, secured additional resources for 
the Bangor Air National Guard and Bangor Naval 
Reserve Center, and was granted an expansion of  the 
Limestone accounting center. As Derek Langhauser conveys, 
Maine’s response to the BRAC Commission’s original 
announcement is testament to the extraordinary capacity 
of  the people of  this state to work together in times  
of  crisis.    
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  “Our best chance of  saving Portsmouth, 
Brunswick and Limestone is to treat the 
Secretary’s recommendations like a lawsuit, 
the Commission like a court, and to present 
our position like a legal case.”
United States Senator  
Olympia J. Snowe,  
May 2005
INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 2005, Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced his department’s list of  
base closures and realignments. It was truly Friday the 
13th for Maine: the secretary’s major recommendations 
proposed closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the 
Limestone Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS), and substantially reducing Brunswick Naval 
Air Station (NAS). Maine’s job loss from these recom-
mendations was the second largest in the nation, with 
at least 13,800 direct and indirect jobs slated to be lost. 
Maine’s congressional delegation and governor (herein-
after collectively referred to as “Maine”) had only weeks 
to prepare for site visits, and less than two months 
to prepare for its four-hour formal hearing before 
the Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
Commission. 
By late August, the commission had reached its 
decisions on these and all of  the secretary’s other 
recommendations around the country. The commission 
approved 86% of  the secretary’s recommendations, 
a higher percentage than any of  the four preceding 
BRAC Commissions. And, while the commis-
sion recommended closing the Brunswick NAS, the 
state had saved the Portsmouth shipyard, saved the 
Limestone DFAS, won expansion of  the Limestone 
center, won two additional planes and their crews for 
the Bangor Air National Guard, and secured several 
jobs for the Bangor Naval Reserve Center.1
This article presents an account of  the three 
months in 2005—from early May to late August—
during which Maine prepared and presented these 
cases, focusing on the background, issues, determining 
factors, and lessons of  this BRAC round.
THE BRAC PROCESS
After years of  unsuccessful efforts to close military 
bases and to shift assets to new 
and emerging threats, Congress 
in 1988 created by statute the 
base realignment and closure 
process, commonly known as 
“BRAC.”  Under this process, 
the Defense Department inven-
tories all of  its domestic mili-
tary assets and identiﬁes those 
that it believes no longer have 
the highest military value. The 
department then recommends 
to an independent commission 
closing or realigning (e.g., typi-
cally reducing but sometimes 
expanding) such facilities.2 
That commission, consisting 
in this round of  nine former 
generals, admirals, and govern-
ment ofﬁcials appointed by the 
president, reviews the depart-
ment’s recommendations.3 The commission can accept, 
reject, or modify the secretary’s recommendations, but 
it can only reject or modify a recommendation if  the 
commission ﬁnds that the secretary “substantially devi-
ated” from the Department’s “Force Structure Plan”—a 
broad national defense planning document—and at 
least one of  eight speciﬁc statutory criteria. 
The ﬁrst four criteria, which are expressly given 
priority by the BRAC statute, relate to these “military 
values”: (1) mission capabilities and the impact on 
operational readiness of  the total force; (2) availability 
and condition of  land, facilities and associated airspace, 
including staging areas for the use in homeland defense 
missions; (3) ability to accommodate contingency, 
mobilization, surge and future total force requirements; 
and (4) cost of  operations and the manpower impli-
cations. The last four criteria—which are given less 
priority by the statute—speak to these administrative 
and community values: (5) extent and timing of  poten-
tial costs and savings; (6) economic impact on existing 
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the existing and potential receiving communities to 
support forces, missions and personnel; and (8) envi-
ronmental impact, including the impact of  costs related 
to environmental restoration and compliance.4
After the secretary issues his recommendations, the 
BRAC Commission tours each affected facility, hears 
from each affected state at a regional hearing, hears 
from the Defense Department, and then makes its own 
recommendations as to which facilities have the highest 
military and related values under these eight criteria. 
The commission sends these revised recommendations 
to the president and Congress who must each accept 
or reject the commission’s list in its entirety. If  both fail 
to reject the list, the recommendations on the list take 
effect, and facilities have up to six years to implement 
their closures or realignments. Commissions on average 
have accepted 84% of  the secretary’s recommenda-
tions, and no president or Congress has ever rejected a 
commission’s list of  recommendations.
PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS
The 2005 round of  base closures was the ﬁfth of  its kind, with prior rounds occurring in 1988, 1991, 
1993, and 1995. In those four rounds, commissions 
closed 97 and realigned 55 major bases, and closed or 
realigned 235 additional facilities. Ofﬁcials estimate 
that approximately $29 billion have been saved from 
these rounds.5  
The 2005 round, however, was far more complex 
and far-reaching than these previous rounds. After 
developing an estimated 25 million data points 
and running 1,000 different scenarios, the Defense 
Department presented 190 separate recommendations 
involving as many as 837 distinct closures or realign-
ments at 160 different installations. These recom-
mendations consisted of  closing 33 and realigning 
29 major bases and making 775 other changes. The 
department expected to achieve long-term savings 
of  nearly $48 billion from implementation of  these 
recommendations.
Given this enormous dollar value and the more 
than 800 “moving parts” as the commission chair  
called them, the 2005 round was the largest, most 
complex, and most aggressive base closure round in 
American history. Indeed, as the commission would 
later note, “Secretary Rumsfeld was very clear that  
his primary goal for the [2005] BRAC process was 
military transformation.” 
DEFINING MAINE’S STRATEGY
Maine’s strategy for ﬁghting these closures was based on the legal and historical background  
just described. 
Organization. The challenge of  defending three 
very different facilities—a shipyard, an air station  
and an accounting center—would require excellent 
organization. Maine’s congressional delegation of  
Senators Snowe and Susan Collins and Representatives 
Tom Allen and Michael Michaud came together 
quickly to assign tasks. They also worked closely  
with Governor John Baldacci, who funded expert 
consultants. For the Portsmouth shipyard, the delega-
tion also coordinated closely with New Hampshire’s 
four congressmen and governor.
Planning window. Unlike prior rounds that 
required the department to plan just six years out, 
the 2005 BRAC statute imposed a 20-year planning 
window. This placed a greater burden on the Defense 
Department to justify the long-term implications of  its 
recommendations. For example, could the department 
really show what the Navy’s submarine repair needs 
would be 20 years from now?
Excess vs surge capacity. Previous BRAC statutes 
focused almost exclusively on whether the department 
had too much “excess capacity.” The 2005 statute, 
however, required the additional consideration of  
“surge capacity.” Surge capacity is the reverse concept 
of  too much excess capacity; it speaks to whether there 
is enough excess capacity to meet foreseeable, even if  
arguably remote, emergency needs. For example, if  
The challenge of defending three very 
different facilities—a shipyard, an air  
station and an accounting center— 
would require excellent organization.
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the Portsmouth shipyard were closed, would there be 
enough excess capacity among the Navy’s nuclear ship 
repair yards to accommodate the inevitable crisis?
Military value. By expressly prioritizing the four 
military value criteria, the statute required faithful, if  
not begrudging, respect for the fact that community or 
state economic impact would not be a priority for the 
commission. For the same reason, saving money, while 
certainly an important consideration, would also not 
be a decisive factor for either the department or the 
commission if  there were not a corresponding military 
value to such savings.
Force Structure Plan. The Defense Department’s 
“Force Structure Plan,” although primarily a broad 
conceptual planning document, raised some questions 
about how many submarines the Navy expected to 
have 20 years out. For example, the plan suggested 
that the Navy would go from approximately 55 
submarines in 2005 to approximately 45 submarines 
in 2025. But what was the source of  and rationale for 
this relatively dramatic reduction, and did it errone-
ously assume congressional support for such a reduc-
tion? Furthermore how did they square with the Chief  
of  Naval Operations’ seemingly inconsistent testimony 
to the BRAC Commission on May 17, 2005, indi-
cating that Navy was moving to a force level of  41, 
not 45, submarines?
History of other commissions. Prior commissions 
dealt with both naval air stations and shipyards, 
so knowledge of  their analyses and fate would be 
instructional. For example, the closure and/or realign-
ment of  naval air stations like Brunswick were among 
the commissions’ most common acts. For shipyards, 
however, the record was more mixed. 
For example, the 1991 commission closed the 
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, and the 1993 commis-
sion closed shipyards in South Carolina and Mare 
Island, California. The 1993 commission, which spoke 
declaratively of  the need to eliminate “considerable” 
excess yard capacity, also considered on its own initia-
tive closing shipyards in both Portsmouth and Long 
Beach, California. At that time, the Navy argued against 
closing Portsmouth, and the commission never added 
either to the list of  recommendations sent to the presi-
dent. Similarly, the 1995 commission closed the ship-
yard in Long Beach and a ship repair facility in Guam 
and, as its predecessor did in 1993, the commission 
on its own initiative ofﬁcially considered closing the 
Portsmouth shipyard. Again, however, the Navy argued 
against closing Portsmouth facility, and the 1995 
commission never added Portsmouth to its recommen-
dations to the president. In addition, the 1995 commis-
sion did not deﬁne the excess yard capacity by 1995 to 
be “considerable.”
Knowledge of  this history showed that naval air 
stations like Brunswick often lost in BRAC rounds, 
and that shipyards like Portsmouth lived or died—and 
mostly died—on the issue of  excess capacity. However, 
it also showed that excess shipyard capacity had been 
signiﬁcantly drawn down by the acts of  the 1993 and 
1995 commissions, especially with the closure of  the 
shipyard in Charleston, South Carolina, which, like the 
one in Portsmouth, was a nuclear facility. Furthermore, 
because the Portsmouth shipyard appeared on both the 
1993 and 1995 potential closure list, Maine knew that 
Portsmouth was both vulnerable and capable of  weath-
ering a challenge. 
Importance of the commission. The structure and 
history of  the BRAC process showed that if  Maine 
were going to win, it had to be at the commission 
level. Although it is theoretically possible to reverse a 
commission recommendation by appealing ﬁrst to the 
president and then to Congress, this had never success-
fully occurred in any of  the prior rounds. Indeed, such 
appeals are counter to the very reason that a president 
and Congress created such commissions, i.e., to permit 
progressive change in national defense without obstruc-
tion by more narrow parochial interests.
Likewise, going to court would hold little promise, 
since both the Supreme Court of  the United States and 
several lower courts had effectively foreclosed judicial 
review of  the substantive BRAC decisions by defense 
secretaries, BRAC Commissions, and presidents.6  For 
example, these courts, including the Maine federal 
district court in a challenge to the closure of  Loring 
Air Force Base in 1991, consistently rejected some 20 
different constitutional and statutory claims against 
the BRAC process. Speciﬁcally, the courts have held 
that the process is a permissible, delegated, administra-
tive power because the BRAC statute contains speciﬁc 
substantive standards (i.e., the eight listed criteria) and 
clear procedural safeguards (i.e., the mechanisms for 
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presidential and congressional disapproval). Similarly, 
the courts have held that, by enacting a statute that has 
a commission provide technical review of  the secre-
tary and the president and Congress provide political 
review of  the commission, Congress did not intend 
to provide substantive judicial review of  the process. 
Instead, questions of  “military judgment” are better left, 
the courts have said, to the more expert policy deci-
sions of  the executive and legislative branches.
Factual defense. The BRAC statute required Maine to 
show not just that the secretary of  defense committed a 
technical error in arriving at his recommendations, but 
that he “substantially deviated” from at least one of  the 
eight statutory criteria cited above. To meet this high 
standard, Maine’s attack would ﬁrst have to be factual. 
And the strongest facts would be those that were “certi-
ﬁed” (for reliability) by the Defense Department, and 
related to at least one of  the four military value criteria. 
Such fact-based analysis would require signiﬁcant input 
from the local groups at each of  the three installations. 
Once these facts were in hand, they could be marshaled 
into a weight analysis; the pertinent criterion to which 
such analysis applied could be identiﬁed, and such 
analyses could be used to argue “substantial deviation.” 
With history demonstrating that commissions accept all 
but about 16% of  the department’s recommendations, 
such factual discipline would be essential. 
Justiﬁcation for recommendation. A review of  all four 
commission reports between 1988 and 1995 demon-
strated that Maine’s case had to focus very speciﬁcally 
on the secretary’s stated justiﬁcation for his recom-
mendation. Prior commission reports showed that it 
was the secretary’s speciﬁc stated justiﬁcation—and not 
some broader conceptual or other factual argument—
that would be judged by the Commission.
So with each of  these ideas in mind, Maine set 
about making its case for the facilities in Portsmouth, 
Brunswick, Limestone, and Bangor.
THE CASE FOR THE  
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which despite its name is located in Kittery, is one of  four public nuclear 
shipyards run by the Navy. Its basic job is to repair 
nuclear submarines. The secretary recommended closing 
the Portsmouth yard and moving its various repair and 
planning functions to Norfolk, Virginia, and Puget 
Sound, Washington. This recommendation projected 
saving $1.3 billion and causing 9,166 direct and indi-
rect job losses. Because of  the size of  these impacts, this 
recommendation was one of  the most closely watched 
and hotly contested in the entire 2005 BRAC round.
The secretary justiﬁed his recommendation to 
close the Portsmouth shipyard by arguing that there 
was enough aggregate excess capacity across their four 
shipyards to warrant closing the facilities in either 
Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. The secretary argued 
there was insufﬁcient excess capacity to close any 
other shipyard or combination of  shipyards, and that 
Portsmouth was selected rather than Pearl Harbor 
because closing the Portsmouth shipyard would elimi-
nate excess capacity while retaining a shipyard with an 
operational homeport in the Paciﬁc. The Portsmouth 
shipyard, situated on the Atlantic without an opera-
tional homeport, was thereby deemed to be less desir-
able than the yard in Pearl Harbor.
In response to this justiﬁcation for closure, Maine 
made three primary arguments. As a threshold matter, 
Maine argued that underlying the plan to reduce 
submarine repair capacity was the department’s 
apparent, though not expressly clear, long-term plan 
to reduce the size of  the Navy’s submarine ﬂeet from 
55 to 45 (or perhaps 41) boats. Maine, seizing on the 
uncertainty of  the statute’s 20-year window, challenged 
the quality of  this presumption.7 For example, Maine 
pointed to the increasing submariner threat posed by 
China as evidence of  the Navy’s misjudgment in plan-
ning for this level of  reduction.
Second, Maine argued that Portsmouth’s highly 
skilled workforce has made the Portsmouth yard 
the Navy’s most productive shipyard and that their 
expertise would be irretrievably lost because they 
would likely not move to Virginia or Washington. For 
example, because of  the shipyard’s efﬁciency, it had 
provided approximately 60 additional weeks of  subma-
rine operation time over the last ﬁve years by returning 
boats ahead of  schedule. By contrast, 124 weeks of  
operation time had been lost due to the combined 
inefﬁciencies of  the other shipyards. Furthermore, the 
then-current performance at the other shipyards was 
already resulting in an additional loss of  108 weeks 
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of  operational time for 2006. Extrapolating from these 
ﬁgures, Maine argued that, over the next ﬁve years, 
the Navy would lose at least 184 weeks of  submarine 
operation time—37 weeks per year—if  the commis-
sion closed Portsmouth. Maine then argued that the 
Navy could ill afford to lose those 37 weeks because, 
as the commander of  Naval submarine forces had 
testiﬁed to Congress that summer, “possibly the best 
Force level yardstick (for submarines) is the Combatant 
Commander deployment requests for daily submarine 
operations, which exceeds what we can provide with 
the current force, and [these] Commanders currently 
want 150 percent of  the critical mission days that we 
can provide.” 
Third, Maine challenged the Navy’s excess and 
surge capacity analyses. On this issue, the Navy had 
asserted that closing the Portsmouth shipyard would 
still leave excess capacity in the other three shipyards. 
Maine argued, however, that the Navy’s own data 
showed that the Navy overestimated the workload 
capacity of  the three other yards, underestimated 
the workload efﬁciency of  Portsmouth, and if  the 
Portsmouth shipyard were closed, there would be 
little to no capacity for any “surge” at the remaining 
three yards. 
This point was bolstered by the testimony to 
Congress by the director of  naval reactors that “any 
further reductions in [submarine repair] capacity would 
push the limits of  viability and eliminate the modest 
surge capacity we have today.” Further driving home 
this point was a retired admiral whom the secretary’s 
ofﬁce prevented from testifying at Maine’s regional 
hearing. Although the admiral’s testimony had been 
previously cleared by one Navy ofﬁce, the secretary’s 
ofﬁce informed the admiral, just hours before the 
hearing, of  potentially severe personal consequences 
for testifying. Maine, however, deduced that such 
consequences only attached to an appearance before 
the commission in an ofﬁcial session and not to an 
appearance before a less formal fact-ﬁnding session. 
Accordingly, Maine did not present the admiral’s testi-
mony at the formal regional hearing, but his views 
were later made available to commission staff  and 
members in an informal session.
In rendering its decision, the commission agreed 
with Maine on all of  Maine’s major points. The 
commission ﬁrst agreed that 
looking out the 20-year 
window, there were concerns 
about how large the subma-
rine ﬂeet would or should 
be by 2025, and that these 
concerns were exacerbated by 
the “uncertainties of  future 
threats” by countries like China. 
The commission also agreed 
with Maine that, while there 
was approximately 27% excess 
depot maintenance capacity 
across the four yards, this excess 
capacity fell to a mere 8% if  
Portsmouth shipyard closed. 
Finding that this percentage 
did not provide for adequate 
surge capability, the commission 
concluded that the secretary’s 
recommendation to close the 
Portsmouth yard substan-
tially deviated from the surge 
capacity factor in criterion 3. 
The commission then voted, 
with just one dissenter, to keep 
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
open.8
By rejecting the secretary’s recommendation on 
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard—one of  the most 
visible, contested, and valuable (i.e., $1.3 billion) 
recommendations of  this entire BRAC round—the 
commission showed its clear independence from the 
Defense Department. Maine had won the Portsmouth 
shipyard back, and it did so from the very grounds 
that it argued.
THE CASE FOR THE  
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION
Brunswick Naval Air Station is also operated by the Navy. It provides maritime patrols of  the North 
Atlantic and an intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance platform in support of  the war on terrorism. 
The secretary recommended realigning Brunswick 
by moving its aircraft and personnel to Jacksonville, 
By rejecting the  
secretary’s recom-
mendation on the 
Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard—one of the 
most visible, contested, 
and valuable (i.e.,  
$1.3 billion) recom-
mendations of this 
entire BRAC round—
the commission 
showed its clear inde-
pendence from the 
Defense Department.
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Florida. The Defense Department projected the loss 
of  4,266 direct and indirect jobs in Maine and the 
savings of  $239 million. The secretary’s justiﬁcations 
for realigning the Brunswick NAS were cost savings 
and efﬁciency; the department did not argue that the 
realignment would enhance any other military value.
The department’s deliberative documents showed 
that the decision to realign the Brunswick NAS was 
a compromise between those within the Navy who 
wanted to close it for full savings, and those within the 
U.S. Northern Command, Fleet Forces Command, and 
the department’s Infrastructure Executive Council who 
wanted to retain it for its strategic location and future 
capability. When faced with the closure recommenda-
tion, Maine looked to these three expert groups and 
advanced their arguments: that the Brunswick NAS is 
the last active duty defense airﬁeld in New England 
and one of  only two (the other being McGuire Air 
Force Base in southern New Jersey) in the Northeast. 
Maine further argued that closure would eliminate a 
homeland defense staging and training area, and that 
closure would forgo a militarily strategic location near 
North Atlantic sea lanes and the closest point to Europe 
and the Middle East. In addition, Maine argued that 
Brunswick NAS had unique and modern facilities that 
could support the Navy’s entire military aircraft inven-
tory and that any actual cost savings would be far less 
than projected.
After the initial hearing where Maine raised all 
of  these issues, the commission on its own initiative 
considered closing Brunswick to achieve even greater 
cost savings. The commission then accorded Maine 
a new hearing on that proposal and the Defense 
Department, ironically enough, joined Maine’s effort at 
this hearing to dissuade the commission from closing 
the Brunswick facility. 
In the end, however, the commission again 
showed its independence, concluding that “closure 
would reduce excess capacity and result in signiﬁcant 
savings while realignment would accomplish neither” 
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
2005: 102). The commission found that closure  
would yield $798 million in savings; realignment 
would have produced only $239 million. The commis-
sion also argued that even without Brunswick there 
were still suitable operating sites to support the  
department’s mission support responsibilities else-
where in New England. The commission also rejected 
Maine’s homeland defense arguments, ﬁnding that 
the commission’s other realignments addressed the 
homeland defense needs of  New England. Here, the 
commission was primarily referring to its decision  
to keep open the Otis Air National Guard Base in 
Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Finally, the Commission 
reasoned that closure was better than realignment 
for the local community because realignment made 
it “virtually impossible for the community to success-
fully redevelop the site” (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission 2005: 102). With just one 
vote to spare, the commission rejected the views, not 
only of  Maine, but also of  the secretary of  defense, 
U.S. Northern Command, Fleet Forces Command,  
and the Infrastructure Executive Council, and then 
voted to close Brunswick.9
THE CASE FOR LIMESTONE DEFENSE  
FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service, known as “DFAS,” at Limestone provides 
accounting services to all branches of  the mili-
tary. Created to soften the regional economic blow 
from closure of  Loring Air Force Base in 1994, the 
Limestone DFAS is one of  26 such accounting facilities 
around the country. The Defense Department recom-
mended closing the Limestone facility and 22 others 
in order to collapse the entire system into just three 
centers. The department’s goal on the Limestone DFAS 
was clear: to save money and streamline efﬁciency by 
Maine did not wait until its regional 
hearing to make its case…[but] made its 
case much earlier at the site visits and in 
its frequent coordinated communications 
with commissioners and staff.
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eliminating 391 direct and indirect jobs in Maine.
Maine advanced three primary arguments to save 
the Limestone facility. First, Maine argued that the 
data that the department used to determine the facil-
ity’s “military value ranking” was based on a number 
of  ﬂawed assumptions that produced misleading and 
incorrect results. For example, the scoring discounted 
the capacity of  the Limestone DFAS to expand its 
operations, to do so with an already secure environ-
ment (i.e., former military bases), and at relatively less 
expense. Second, Maine argued that Limestone DFAS 
has highly trained and motivated employees who 
have a proven track record of  performing services 
at a cost substantially lower than the rate for other 
DFAS sites. And ﬁnally, contrary to prevailing wisdom 
cited above, Maine relied heavily on a non-military 
value argument regarding economic impact. But our 
reasoning was unique.
Unlike most other BRAC proposals, the recom-
mendation to close the Limestone DFAS facility 
represented a double closure. When the 1991 BRAC 
round closed Loring Air Force Base, the ensuing 5,600 
layoffs increased that region’s unemployment by more 
than one-third. The Limestone DFAS had become the 
cornerstone of  the economic recovery efforts, which 
the department was now taking away. Worse yet, 
the Defense Department’s own data showed that the 
regional impact of  the 2005 Limestone DFAS closure 
would be greater than in any other DFAS community in 
the nation. Simply put, hitting Aroostook County twice 
within 15 years with the heaviest of  job losses was not 
only undue and unfair, it was breach of  faith from the 
promise the department made in 1994.
Maine then went on the offensive to argue that 
the Limestone facility should not only stay open, but 
that it should be expanded as a low-cost “center of  
excellence.” The Limestone facility’s operating costs 
are one-half  of  those facilities in Columbus, Ohio, 
and Indianapolis, Indiana, and well under one-third 
of  those in Denver, Colorado—the three sites slated 
to absorb Limestone’s work. Again, Maine used the 
department’s own ﬁnancial data to prove that point. 
Showing both an impressive attention to detail 
and a somewhat surprising level of  compassion, the 
commission agreed. It found that there were discrepan-
cies in the DFAS sites’ military value scores, and that 
the Limestone DFAS’s location on a former base gave 
it both space and ﬂexibility for the future. The real 
key, however, was the commission’s ﬁnding that the 
department did not adequately consider the economic 
impact of  its recommendation. For accounting facili-
ties in both Limestone and Rome, New York, which 
had also suffered previous BRAC cuts, the commission 
found that by retaining these two sites, the department 
could both preserve operational capacity and strategic 
redundancy, as well as eliminate an undue and unfair 
economic impact. Concluding that the secretary devi-
ated substantially from ﬁnal selection criteria 3, 4, and 
6, the commission, again asserting its independence, 
voted unanimously to keep the DFAS in Limestone and 
Rome open, each with expansion.
THE CASES FOR BANGOR NAVAL RESERVE 
CENTER AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD
The secretary also made two smaller recommenda-tions with the potential to beneﬁt the state, both 
of  which were in the Bangor region. First, the secre-
tary recommended moving seven positions from the 
Bangor Naval Reserve Center to Brunswick Naval Air 
Station. Although these positions could have then been 
eliminated by force of  the recommendation to close the 
Brunswick NAS, Maine was able to get the commission 
to bring these positions back to Bangor. Second, the 
secretary recommended adding two KC-135 airplanes 
and their crews to the Bangor Air National Guard. This 
recommendation came under attack, however, by other 
states that were losing such assets and their related legal 
challenges that National Guard assets were not within 
the jurisdiction of  the BRAC Commission. In the end, 
these legal challenges fell away and the commission 
made several adjustments to the secretary’s overall allo-
cation of  National Guard assets. Nonetheless, Maine’s 
effort to obtain the two additional planes and their 
crews was afﬁrmed by the commission.
LESSONS LEARNED
Looking back, several decisions stand out as essential to Maine’s success in the 2005 BRAC round. First, 
Maine did not wait until its regional hearing to make 
its case. Maine made its case much earlier at the site 
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visits and in its frequent coordinated communications 
with commissioners and staff. Maine also continued 
to present its case even after the regional hearing 
passed. Here, Maine took advantage of  the commis-
sioners’ willingness to meet with local community 
groups during site visits even though they were not 
statutorily required to do so. In this way, the commis-
sioners received information beyond the standard 
“party line” that the Defense Department required base 
commanders to present. Indeed, it was in these meet-
ings that the commission ﬁrst heard expert analyses 
on shipyard capacity, expert rebuttal of  the economic 
justiﬁcation for the realignment of  the Brunswick NAS, 
and the pitch by DFAS to both preserve and expand its 
operation. Such face-to-face meetings will prove crucial 
in future rounds of  base closures. 
Second, Maine did not limit its contacts to just 
commissioners. Maine understood very early on how 
the BRAC Commission itself  worked. BRAC staff  
would ﬁrst sort through the voluminous data and then 
make recommendations to the commissioners. Getting 
BRAC staff to hear and accept Maine’s arguments early 
was crucial. A good example of  this was the unclas-
siﬁed and/or classiﬁed brieﬁng that Maine suggested 
that commission staff  receive regarding the emerging 
submariner threat posed by China in evaluating the 
Portsmouth shipyard and the long-term needs of  the 
U.S. Navy’s submarine support.
Third, Maine’s persistent communications with  
the commissioners and their staff  reinforced that they 
were truly independent from the Defense Department. 
They had their own fact-ﬁnding skills, their own 
substantive expertise, with every bit as much experi-
ence as those in the department to make the right—
even if  different—decisions.
Fourth, Maine turned quickly and consistently to 
the local sites for their expertise on the relevant facts. 
Local groups at each location got to work immediately 
and worked tirelessly to pull together the facts and data 
necessary to make a strong factual case. Such accu-
rate and deep factual development was indispensable, 
especially in the case of  the work by Earl Donnell, an 
expert in the maximum, excess, and surge workload 
capacities of  both the Portsmouth and the other three 
public shipyards.
Fifth, where possible, Maine identiﬁed military 
experts to argue the military value of  the Portsmouth 
and Brunswick facilities. Commissioners, of  course, 
expect politicians and community groups to defend 
their constituent interests. So it was those who have 
both military expertise and no particular home-state 
bias who, like former Rear Admiral William Klemm 
in the case of  Portsmouth, would stand out with the 
Commissioners.
Sixth, Maine’s effort was internally cooperative 
and therefore very efﬁcient. There was strong coordina-
tion among the congressional delegations and gover-
nors of  both Maine and New Hampshire. In a time 
where political divisiveness and rancor often seem to 
dominate the political landscape, the level of  coopera-
tion and collaboration in this effort was impressive. 
Indeed, this effort was, in many respects, representa-
tive government at its best, with elected ofﬁcials from 
local, state, and federal governments, the legislative and 
executive branches, and the states of  Maine and New 
Hampshire all pulling in the same direction towards 
one common goal.
Finally, Maine stuck to hard facts—not political, 
rhetorical, or emotional appeals—to makes its cases. 
This was perhaps the most commanding lesson that 
Senator Snowe, the only member of  the 2005 Maine 
delegation who was a veteran of  the 1991 Loring 
hearing, brought forward for the defense. And Maine’s 
and New Hampshire’s congressional delegations were 
also well served by skilled staff  who had the military 
experience necessary to communicate effectively with 
the commission and to translate those communications 
effectively for the delegations and governors.
…the 2005 BRAC Commission accepted 
86% of the secretary’s recommendations… . 
Maine, for its part, won four of the ﬁve  
total cases, and two of the three major 
cases that it fought.
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ENDNOTES
1.   For a copy of the commission’s 800-page ﬁnal report 
to the president, see http://www.brac.gov/docs/ﬁnal/
Volume1BRACReport.pdf
2.   For a complete copy of the department’s 400-page 
recommendations, see http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/
pdf/Vol_I_Part_2_DOD_BRAC.pdf
3.   For the biographies of these Commissioners, see http://
www.brac.gov/commissioners. asp
4.    For a verbatim copy of these eight criteria, see http://
www.brac.gov/docs/criteria_ﬁnal_jan4_05.pdf  For a 
complete copy of the 40-page 2005 BRAC statute, see 
http://www.brac.gov/docs/BRAC05Legislation.pdf
 I think it is you who 
saved this shipyard. It was 
your skill; your dedica-
tion; your excellence; and 
your efﬁciency that saved 
this shipyard. It was your 
productivity; your consis-
tency; your labor-manage-
ment relations; and your 
safety record that saved this 
shipyard. It was your lead-
ership; your innovation; 
and your preeminence. 
 It was, in a word, you—
every one of  you—who 
saved this shipyard. This 
win is yours; you earned it 
and you deserve it.  And 
it has been my highest 
privilege to represent you 
and to help to tell your 
commanding story.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, the 2005 BRAC Commission accepted 86% of  the secretary’s recommendations, saving 
by its own 20-year estimates some $15 billion. Of  
the Defense Department’s 190 recommendations, 
the commission approved 119 with no change and 
accepted another 45 with amendments. Of  the 33 
major closures that the secretary recommended, the 
commission approved 21, realigned seven, and rejected 
ﬁve. Of  the 29 major realignments that the secretary 
recommended, the commission approved 25.  Maine, 
for its part, won four of  the ﬁve total cases and two of  
the three major cases that it fought.
As projected, lawsuits in or by eight states were all 
unsuccessful in their attempt to overcome the commis-
sion’s recommendations to the president. And as further 
expected, the president accepted the list without 
change, and Congress did not exercise its authority 
to disapprove the list. Consequently, on November 9, 
2005, the commission’s recommendations took effect.
Clearly, the loss of  the Brunswick NAS was disap-
pointing, and many good people worked very hard to 
save it. But, in retrospect, it appears that the Brunswick 
facility was lost where a political delegation could 
not win it: by the commission overruling the recom-
mendations of  the U.S. Northern Command, Fleet 
Forces Command, and the department’s Infrastructure 
Executive Council to keep Brunswick open. For its 
part, Limestone DFAS was won on its excellent track 
record of  efﬁciency and service, and on the unique 
and powerful “double closure” argument. And the 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was won by taking the 
Navy’s capacity analysis head on. But that argument, 
it is appropriate to note in closing, was made possible 
only by the extraordinary performance record of  the 
Portsmouth’s highly skilled and dedicated employees. 
As Senator Snowe told these workers after the 
Commission announced its ﬁnal vote:
 Two months ago, members of  the BRAC 
Commission traveled to these gates and you 
met them by the thousands. And you had but 
a simple message for them. You said, “Save 
Our Shipyard.” That’s right; you asked them 
to save your shipyard. Well, now that the 
verdict is in, let me tell you what I think. 
Derek P. Langhauser is a Maine 
attorney. He has served as a 
law clerk to the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, chief counsel to a 
governor of Maine, and general 
counsel of the Maine Community 
College System, and is a member 
of the American Law Institute and 
several editorial boards and advi-
sory commissions. He served as 
special counsel for United States 
Senator Olympia J. Snowe in the 
2005 round of base closures before 
the Defense Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission.
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5.   For documents relating to these prior BRAC rounds, 
see http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/priorbracs.html
6.   See, for example, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994); 
National Federation of Federal Employees v. U.S., 905 
F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1990) afﬁrming 727 F.Supp. 17 (D.C. 
D.C. 1989); Illinois v. Cheney, 726 F.Supp. 219 (C.D. Ill. 
1989); Cohen v. Rice, 800 F.Supp. 999 (D.C. Me. 1992) 
(unsuccessful challenge to closure of Loring).
7.   The quotes used in this discussion of the case for the 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are taken from the testi-
mony presented at the Maine’s regional hearing. For a 
complete copy of the Maine delegation’s testimony on 
Portsmouth, Brunswick, and Limestone at the regional 
hearing on July 6, 2005, and for a copy of the delega-
tion’s re-hearing testimony on Brunswick on August 10, 
2005, see http://www.brac.gov/hearingInfo.asp.
8.   Commissioner Philip Coyle spoke to this issue with this 
memorable remark: “All human activity must involve 
some amount of excess capacity. I don’t use my garage 
24 hours a day, but I’m not about to tear it down.”   
9.   The BRAC statute provided for two different 
vote counts for the commission. For example, the 
Portsmouth and Limestone items required a ﬁve-vote 
majority because the motion was on the secretary’s 
recommendation. By contrast, the Brunswick vote 
required a seven-vote majority because the motion was 
on the commission’s recommendation.
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